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The Return of United States
Servicemen for Offenses
Committed Overseas
Stanley D. Metzger
John P. McMahon*
I.

E

INTRODUCTION

always been a timely subject, but rarely has
it been more in the forefront of public discussion and dispute
than in the current season of hijackings and related acts of violence.
It is peculiarly appropriate to consider, in this connection, the legal
problems involved in returning
United States servicemen to the
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York Bar. JoHN P. McMAHoN (A.B.,
St. Peters College; J.D., New York Uni-

countries.

versity) is a Captain in the U.S. Army,
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serving with the International Affairs
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General, and a member of the New York

members of our armed forces

Bar.

stationed in some 384 facilities

and 3,000 minor installations

overseas.' While the great majority of servicemen stationed on foreign territory are law-abiding
soldiers anxious to complete their tours of duty honorably and to
return to their education or other peaceful pursuits, inevitably there
are those who violate the local laws. Some do so inadvertently while
performing their official duties or conducting their personal activities.
But a small, although significant, minority commit deliberate crimes
of malice against members of the local population. The much publicized allegations of "war crimes" in Vietnam are examples of offenses committed in the hostile environment of armed conflict. As
the statistics compiled by the Department of Defense indicate, however, a substantial number of servicemen commit serious crimes un* The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Judge Advocate General's Corps or those of any other agency of the
United States Government.
1 Symington, Congress's Right to Know, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1970, § 6 (Magazine),
at 62.
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der noncombat circumstances, in the areas surrounding bases and in
cities far removed from hostilities. Taking as examples some offenses which are normally extraditable under United States treaties,2
in the 5-year period from December 1, 1963, to November 30, 1968,
American servicemen stationed abroad were alleged to have committed 980 homicides, 1,258 rapes, 78 arsons, 7,772 robberies and larcenies and 2,891 aggravated assaults. 3 These statistics represent only
those offenses which were subject to the host countries' primary
jurisdiction under agreements with the United States; offenses which
were subject to the primary or exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, such as offenses committed in the performance of official duty,
are not included.
Considering the large number of offenses committed, it is not
surprising that sometimes an individual accused of an offense is no
longer in the host state's territory when the local authorities decide
to prosecute him. He may have been transferred to another place
or discharged from the service before the offense, or his connection
with it, was discovered. And as a recent case shows,4 administrative
errors will sometimes result in the transfer of a serviceman from the
host country while his prosecution is pending. Moreover, in this jet
age, it is not inordinately difficult for a United States serviceman,
without leave from his superiors, to depart from the host country to
avoid prosecution. 5
This article analyzes the issues which arise if the accused serviceman escapes to or is transferred to the United States, and the foreign country in which he allegedly committed the offense demands
his return.6 While there is limited authority on the issues raised, sev2 See 39 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPp. 743-56 (1935).
3 Dep't of

Defense, Statistics on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction by Foreign

Tribunals over United States Personnel, for the periods Dec. 1, 1963-Nov. 30, 1964,

Dec. 1, 1964-Nov. 30, 1965, Dec. 1, 1965-Nov. 30, 1966, Dec. 1, 1966-Nov. 30, 1967,
and Dec. 1, 1967-Nov. 30, 1968. See also S. REP. No. 651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);

S. REP. No. 1630, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. REP. No. 946, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967); S. REP. No. 1881, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 707, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
4

Williams v. Rogers, Civil No. 1027 (D.N.D., May 6, 1971), appeal No. 71-

1249 (8th Cir., filed May 10, 1971).
5 See United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa.), aft'd,

431 F.2d 548 (3d Cit. 1970).
6

Throughout the text, the discussion of the "return" of U.S. servicemen should be
understood as referring to the return for the purpose of trial in a foreign court or to
serve a sentence imposed by a foreign court. The use of the term "extradition"
should not be taken to mean that such "return" is extradition in the usual sense of
the term. Indeed, whether the return of a serviceman in such circumstances is or is
not extradition is one of the central issues discussed.
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eral recent cases make a discussion of the topic particularly timely
and appropriate.
In United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson,7 a member of the
United States Air Force was convicted of robbery and attempted
rape by a Japanese court and sentenced to 6 years confinement at
hard labor. He remained in the custody of the United States military authorities pending a decision on his appeal. On August 29,
1969, the Supreme Court of Japan affirmed his conviction. Stone had
not been confined by the U. S. military authorities, and on September
12 he departed for the United States without leave. When the military police apprehended him in Pennsylvania, he petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was no longer in the Air
Force because certain extensions of his service were neither consented
to by him nor validated by the administering to him of the oaths
required by law.
In denying Stone's writ, the district judge was aware that the
Japanese Government had requested Stone's return to Japan and that
the Air Force intended to return him there to serve his sentence;
however, the legality of the impending extradition was not raised by
counsel nor considered by the court. The court stated:
Since the United States Government had an obligation to retain custody of the petitioner pursuant to the SOFA [Status of Forces
Agreement] with the Government of Japan, and the petitioner had
an obligation to make himself available when wanted by the Government of Japan, neither the Government of the United States could
breach its obligation to Japan, nor could the petitioner after the
appellate proceedings became final, suddenly leave the jurisdiction
of Japan. When he did leave the jurisdiction of Japan, it was incumbent upon the United States Government to arrest and seize him,
wherever it could find him, and return him. I therefore conclude
and hold that the arrest by the Armed Forces of the petitioner as
of the time when he was arrested was a valid arrest and that the
Government of the United States is entitled to his custody for the
purpose of returning 8him to the jurisdiction where it was bound to
hold him in custody.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial
of Stone's writ.' Citing Girard v. Wilson,'0 the court felt that the
While much of what will be said herein is applicable to a situation where a serviceman has committed an offense in one foreign country and extradition is then requested while he is in another foreign country, such a case is dissimilar in certain critical
respects from the type of case under discussion and is, for reasons of clarity and brevity,
best left for separate analysis.
7309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
81d. at 1268-1269.
9 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970).
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only question for its decision was whether Stone's enlistment extensions were valid. Although it noted Stone's claim that denial of the
writ would result in his being returned to Japan to serve a 6-year
sentence imposed by a Japanese court, the court of appeals, as had the
district court, did not consider in its opinion the question of extradition and the applicability of the extradition treaty with Japan."
In Buskers v. Seamans, 2 a member of the United States Air Force
stationed in the Azores was arrested while on leave in Spain and
charged with possession of a significant quantity of hashish. The
Spanish authorities released Buskers to the custody of the United
States Air Force at Torrejon Air Force Base in Spain, where he was
confined to the base. During this confinement, he received orders
from another Air Force command changing his station to McGuire
Air Force Base in New Jersey, where he was to be separated from the
service. "[I]n some fashion not entirely clear [Buskers] acquired
the necessary travel documents and obtained air transportation from
Torrejon to McGuire. '1 3 He was in the process of being separated
from the service when he was apprehended by the military police.
The airman then sought a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had
sufficiently completed the separation process as to have been finally
separated from the service and that it was the intention of the Air
Force to return him to Spain and turn him over to appropriate Spanish authorities for judicial proceedings. The court held that the
petitioner had not been discharged and was therefore still a member
of the United States Air Force. In his denial of Buskers' writ, the
district judge did not address himself to the question of whether the
action contemplated by the Air Force was extradition. He granted a
stay of 1 day to permit the petitioner to apply to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for appropriate relief. On
September 18, 1970, the court of appeals denied Buskers' application
for a stay of his transfer to Spain by the Air Force.14 On September
19, Mr. Justice Blackmun denied a similar petition for a stay. 5
10 354 U.S. 524 (1957); see text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
11 Treaty with the Empire of Japan Concerning Extradition of Criminals, April 29,
1886, art. VII, 24 Star. 1015 [1886], T.S. No. 191; see note 136 infra and accompanying text.
12 Civil No. 1208-70 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1970), stay denied, No. 19,270 (3rd Cir.
Sept. 18, 1970), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S. Sept. 19, 1970) (Blackmun,

Cir. J.).
Id., Transcript of District Court's Oral Opinion at 6.
19,270 (3d Cir. Sept. 18, 1970), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S.
Sept. 19, 1970) (Blackmun, Cir. J.).
'5 Memorandum Order (U.S. Sept. 19, 1970) (Blackmun, Cir. J.).
13

14 No.
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In Williams v. Rogers,'8 another member of the United States
Air Force was accused of an offense which, under an executive agreement between the United States and the Philippines, 17 was subject
to the primary jurisdiction 8 of the Philippine authorities. He was
released to the custody of the Clark Air Base commander, who, in
accordance with the procedures established under the agreement,
acknowledged in writing that Williams would be made available for
purposes of investigation and would be brought before the Philippine courts when they so requested. Through an oversight, Williams
was not placed on administrative hold, as required by applicable
military regulations, and he was subsequently transferred to the
United States. The Government of the Philippines demanded his
return. At the request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Air Force directed that Williams be returned to
the Philippines. After orders were issued reassigning Williams as
directed, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota alleging inter alia that his reassignment was, in effect, extradition to the Philippines which, in the
absence of an extradition treaty between the Philippines and the
United States, violated his constitutional rights. Suggesting that it
might deal with the extradition issue asserted by Williams, the district court granted his request for a preliminary injunction against
his transfer by the Air Force." On May 6, 1971, however, the court
dissolved the preliminary injunction and, failing to meet the extra16

Civil No. 1027 (D.N.D. May 6, 1971), appeal pending, No. 71-1249 (8th Cir.,

filed May 10, 1971).
17 Agreement Relating to the Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction
Arrangements, Aug. 10, 1965, [1965] 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851.8
1 For a discussion of the concept of primary jurisdiction, see text accompanying
notes 64-69 infra.
19 Civil No. 1027, Memorandum and Order Granting Preliminary Injunction (D.N.
D. May 22, 1970). In his memorandum accompanying the order granting a preliminary
injunction against Williams' return to the Philippines, the district judge looked behind
the ostensible reason for the order and recognized the real purpose and effect of Wil-

lians' return:
It is undisputed that the sole avowed basic purpose of the Defendants in
ordering the return of Williams to the Philippines is to fulfill their obligations
under the Military Bases in the Philippines - although it is argued that such
purpose is merely to correct an administrative error. Certainly, in fairness to
the parties, the Court must look beyond form and to substance. Id.
In his subsequent ruling on the merits, however, the district judge indicated that his

order granting the preliminary injunction was based on Williams' allegations that his
reassignment to the Philippines would violate existing Air Force regulations and Williams' constitutional rights. Finding that Williams' return would not violate Air Force
regulations, the judge dismissed the case without mentioning the "avowed basic purpose" of the reassignment - extradition - to which he referred in the memorandum
above. Id., Memorandum and Order, at 3-4 (May 6, 1971).
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dition question, simply ruled that Williams' reassignment to the
Philippines did not violate an Air Force regulation proscribing the
reassignment of a serviceman to overseas duty within 12 months of
his return from such duty.20
In resolving the question of extradition which the above three
cases left undecided, the following issues will be considered: first,
whether the United States military authorities have an inherent power
to compel a member of the armed forces to return to a foreign country for prosecution and possible punishment; second, whether status
of forces agreements between the United States Government and
its various allies create an obligation to return and surrender a serviceman in the absence of an applicable extradition treaty; finally,
the interrelationship of arrangements concerning criminal jurisdiction over United States servicemen stationed abroad and the extradition treaties.
II. THE POWER OF THE ARMED SERVICES TO
RETURN A SERVICEMAN IN THE ABSENCE OF

TREATY OR STATUTE

It is well established that, as a matter of United States law, the
power of the Government to grant a request for the surrender of a
civilian fugitive to a foreign country is dependent upon the existence
of a treaty or statute authorizing such action. The Supreme Court
has held that under international law there is no duty to extradite
unless such an obligation is created by treaty."' As a matter of
United States law the Government has neither an obligation nor the
authority to seize a fugitive and deliver him to a foreign state in the
absence of treaty or statute. 2 The federal statute which establishes
the procedures for extradition is premised on the existence of an applicable treaty creating an obligation to extradite.28 The only exception to what thus can be said to be the rule that extradition is dependent upon the existence of a treaty is the statutory authorization
for the surrender of fugitives to the military governor or other
chief executive of a foreign country, or any part thereof, which is occupied by or under the authority of the United States.2
20

Id., Memorandum and Order (May 6, 1971).

Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
23 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1964). See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299
U.S. 5, 9-10 (1936).
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1964).
21

22
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As a matter of policy, the United States has not looked with disfavor upon the extradition of its own nationals who have committed
crimes abroad?' Unlike that of certain other countries,26 our domestic law does not absolutely prohibit the extradition of United
States citizens. On the other hand, the case law dearly provides that
the power to extradite a United States citizen does not exist except as
affirmatively granted by treaty or statute 7 Since the federal extradition statute is silent regarding the surrender of United States nationals, such power must be granted by the terms of an applicable
extradition treaty. In Charlton v. Kelly;28 the Supreme Court held
that a citizen of the United States may be extradited under a treaty
requiring the United States to extradite "persons" without specifically
referring to "citizens." The Court rejected the contention that
United States nationals are excluded from the operation of extradition conventions unless specifically included.2 9 In Valentine v.
United States ex rel. Neidecker, 30 the Supreme Court faced the question of whether a grant to the Executive of discretionary power to
surrender citizens of the United States could be implied from the
terms of the treaty before it. While holding that the treaty language
in question - "Neither of the contracting Parties shall be bound to
deliver up its own citizens under the stipulations of this convention."
- could not be so construed, the Court did not preclude the possibility of implying such a power in an appropriate case.3 1
Against this case law and statutory background respecting the
extradition of United States civilian nationals, the question arises
whether an individual's status as a member of the armed forces subjects him to a different dispensation: May the armed forces return
their military personnel from the United States to a foreign country
for a criminal prosecution in its courts in the absence of an extradition agreement between that country and the United States? Otherwise stated, does the power of the armed forces to return their
members to a foreign nation for trial rest on foundations different
from the general United States law on extradition?
§ 18, at 871 (1968); IV G. HACKWORTH,
§ 318, at 55 (1942). See RAFUSE, THE ExTRADITION OF NA-

25 6 U. WHTEMAN, DIGEST OF INf'L L.
DIGEST OF INT'L L.

TIONALS 11-31 (1939).
26 6 A. WHITEMAN, supra note 25, at 865, 871.
27

Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936).

28 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
29

Id. at 467-68.

30 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
31 Id. at 11-13.
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At the outset, it seems well settled that the armed forces have no
authority to seize and return a former member of the armed services. 3" In 1957, a situation arose in which a member of the United
States forces in the Philippines was transferred to the United States
and discharged from the service while criminal proceedings were
pending against him in the local courts. In response to a demand
for his return, authorities of the United States Navy informed the
Philippine Government that the individual was beyond Navy control and that nothing could be done to return him to the Philippines
33
for prosecution.
Where the alleged offender is still in the service, the threshold
question is whether his return constitutes extradition. As noted
above, in United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson,34 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit did not deal with the issue of extradition; it indicated that the only question before it was the validity of
Stone's enlistment extensions. Conceivably, the Stone court did not
believe that the question of Stone's return was properly before it
on appeal since this question had been neither raised by counsel nor
considered by the lower court. Alternatively, the court of appeals
may have taken into account in its ruling the fact that the denial
of his writ would result in Stone's being returned to Japan for
imprisonment, but considered extradition of civilians to be wholly
different from the return of servicemen. The court may have thus
concluded that upon finding Stone's enlistment extensions to be valid,
the Air Force had unquestionable authority to return and surrender
him, at least in such a case where the serviceman had fled the country of prosecution without leave.
Assuming that the latter view above might well have been that
taken by the Stone court, a contrary argument can be made that in
the absence of some authorization by statute or treaty, the armed
forces lack the power to return their members to a foreign government for prosecution. This argument, as discussed below, is based
on the view that the return of any United States citizen to a foreign
country, whether by nonmilitary or military authorities, constitutes
extradition.
32

The lack of military jurisdiction over discharged servicemen is exemplified by Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See Baldwin, Foreign Jurisdiction and the American
Soldier, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 90-91.
33 See generally, Comment, PhilippineJurisdictionOver the George E. Roe Case, 32
PHILIPPINE L.J. 403 (1957); Valeros, Jurisdictionof Philippine Courts Over Personnel
of the United States Military Reservations in the Philippines, 4 UNIV. OF THE EAST L.J.
18 (1961). See also Baldwin, supra note 32.
34 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970); see text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
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The Supreme Court has defined extradition generally as "the
surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and
to punish him, demands the surrender."a 5 More recently, Marjorie
Whiteman has described extradition generally as follows: "Extradition is the process by which, persons charged with or convicted
of crimes against the law of a state and found in a foreign state are
returned by the latter to the former for trial and punishment."a" In
each instance the essence of the definition of extradition is the return and surrender for trial and punishment. It can therefore be
argued that as a matter of principle, the return and surrender of any
individual - even if he is a serviceman - to a foreign country
for trial or punishment is extradition and that consequently, the
United States law respecting extradition must be applied in determining whether such action is lawful.
Moreover, there is broad language in the Valentine37 case quoting
with approval Moore's statement that "there is no authority vested
in any department of the government to seize a fugitive criminal
and surrender him to a foreign power."8 8 The Valentine Court
stated that such a principle
rests upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution
creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the. liberty of the individual. Proceedings against him must be authorized by law.
There is no executive discretion to surrender him to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law.39
Although the Court was not considering the power of military authorities, its statement respecting the lack of any governmental prerogative to surrender a citizen to a foreign government in the ab35

Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
States, 381 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1967).

See also Stevenson v. United

36 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 25, § 1, at 727.
37

Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
See also Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258 (6th
Cir. 1957); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
Surrender in the sense of transporting an individual from the United States in order
to avail him to foreign authorities should be distinguished from surrendering a serviceman who is in the territory of a foreign state for trial by the local authorities. The latter
type of surrender was approved by the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
524 (1957). The decision was premised on the exclusive jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign over persons and activities in its territory. The Wilson decision therefore may
not be relevant to a case in which the individual has returned to the United States and
his return and surrender are thereafter sought by the country of prosecution.
39 299 U.S. at 9.
38 299 U.S. at 9 (emphasis added).
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sence of a statute or treaty creating that power is broad enough to
apply to the military.
In general, the armed services, like other agencies of the Government, are subject to the restrictions of the Constitution and applicable statutes.40 As Mr. Justice Douglas stated in Winters v. United
States,4 "[al member of the Armed Forces is entitled to equal justice
under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander but
as written in the Constitution and engrossed by Congress in our
Public Laws." No one will disagree with the validity of Mr. Justice Douglas's statement as a general principle, but it cannot be denied that the rights of individuals serving in the armed forces are,
to some presently undefined extent, circumscribed by the nature of
the military establishment and the exigencies for which the military
must be prepared. Although judicial relief is available where the
military exceeds its lawful authority in certain functions,42 with respect to the assignment of military personnel, as with so much else
of military life, the courts have consistently followed the rule established in Orloff v. Willoughby.43 There the Supreme Court
held that because of the potential impact on military operations, the
courts cannot review personnel assignments by the armed forces.4 4
The Supreme Court has not, however, been asked to review a
serviceman's assignment to a foreign territory where he will be prosecuted by the local authorities. The validity of such an assignment
was squarely raised before the district court in Williams v. Rogers."
There Williams had to be reassigned to the Philippines because his
return to the United States, although the result of an administrative
40

See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Reed v. Franke, 297 F.2d 17 (4th
Cir. 1961). See also Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57 (1968) (Douglas, Cir. J.);
Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 182 (1962).
41 89 S. Ct. 57, 60 (1968) (Douglas, Cir. J.).
42
See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (Secretary of the Army could
not base his denial of an honorable discharge on servicemen's preinduction conduct);
Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Navy Review Board must adhere
to Navy regulations requiring that its review of a serviceman's discharge be based on
findings of fact disclosed to the serviceman).
43 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (commissioning of drafted doctors and their assignment as
Army doctors is within the discretion of Congress and the President and not that of the
courts).
44 For applications of the Orloff rule, see Noyd v. McNamara, 378 F.2d 538, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966),
aft'd, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Cooper v. Barker,
291 F. Supp. 952 (D. Md. 1968). See also Overseas Media Corp. v. McNamara, 385
F.2d 308, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
45 Civil No. 1027 (D.N.D. May 6, 1971), appeal pending, No. 71-1249 (8th Cir.,
filed May 10, 1971); see text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
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error, was a valid assignment, unlike Stone's absenting himself from
Japan without leave and Buskers' 46 unauthorized departure while he
was restricted to an Air Force base in Spain. Nonetheless, the district judge in Williams failed to meet the extradition issue and simply found that the order to reassign Williams to the Philippines was

not proscribed by Air Force regulations."
If the Valentine principle - that no department of the Government has authority to surrender a United States citizen to a foreign
power for prosecution except as that authority is granted by statute
or treaty - is applicable to the armed forces, the validity of a military order requiring a serviceman to return to a foreign country
where he will be prosecuted or punished can be challenged where
no treaty or statute authorizes such a return. This is certainly true
where the sole purpose of the order is to effect the serviceman's
surrender to the foreign country for prosecution or punishment,
since a valid military order must rest on a legitimate military purpose.'48 Such a challenge may be complicated, however, by the fact
that, while the effect of the reassignment of an individual may be
his subjection to prosecution in a foreign court, the order may on
its face have a legitimate military purpose. For example, in the
Williams case, the order reassigning Williams to the Philippines
was ostensibly issued to correct the administrative error by which
he was inadvertently assigned from Clark Air Base to duty in the
United States.49 And in a case such as Stone, where a serviceman
departs without leave from his place of assignment in order to
avoid prosecution or punishment by the local courts, his return may
be rationalized as a mere return to his unit.
But regardless of the asserted military purpose of a serviceman's
return to a prosecuting country, there is authority to support the argument that the military has no inherent authority to order such a return if that action is tantamount to extradition. In Sayne v. Shipley ° and in an unreported case,51 the Panamanian Government re46 Buskers v. Seamans, Civil No. 1208-70 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1970), stay denied, No.
19,270 (3d Cir. Sept. 18, 1970), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S. Sept. 19, 1970)
(Blackman, Cir. J.); see text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
47 Civil No. 1027, Memorandum and Order, at 3-4 (D.N.D. May 6, 1971); see
note 19 supra.
48
See United States v. Kapla, 22 C.M.R. 825 (1956). Even where a military order
has a legitimate military purpose, the order must not violate an individual's constitutional rights. United States v. Voorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954);
United Seates v. Levinsky, 30 C.M.R. 641 (1960). See generally W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 575-77 (2d ed. 1920).
49
See note 19 supra.
50 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969).
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quested that certain servicemen be extradited from the Canal Zone.
In the Sayne case the Governor of the Canal Zone determined that
extradition was appropriate and ordered that Sayne, a Marine, be
taken into custody for delivery to the Panamanian authorities.
Presumably, if the Marines had held inherent authority to surrender
him to Panama, no such gubernatorial proceedings would have been
required. In the unreported case, an opinion of the Office of the
Legal Adviser of the Department of State similarly indicates that the
Governor of the Canal Zone exercises the power to surrender fugitive servicemen to Panama, and that while he will probably be governed by the desires of the military commander concerned, such commander has no authority in the matter. 2 And an 1876 opinion
of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, regarding the Mexican
Government's request for the surrender of a serviceman by the military commander in Texas, indicates that unless an applicable extradition treaty authorizes him to do so, a military commander may
not take action on a request for the surrender of a serviceman; rather,
the request should be referred to the State Department.53
In the Stone case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit assumed that under Wilson v. Girard," Stone's return and surrender
to the Japanese Government was authorized.55 In Girard, the Supreme Court found no constitutional objection to the surrender of a
serviceman, held by United States Air Force officials in Japan, to the
Japanese Government for prosecution. The decision rested upon the
principle that the territorial sovereign has the exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless
the sovereign waives that exclusive jurisdiction.56 Because the serviceman in Girard remained in Japan from the date of the crime until the date of his surrender to that country's authorities, the case
does not establish the position that the armed services may return
a serviceman from the United States and surrender him to the
prosecuting country.57 But, on the other hand, when read with
51 See IV G. HACKWORTH, supra note 25,

§

338, at 193.

2Id.
53

DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOcATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY
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27 (1912).

354 U.S. 524 (1957).
55 431 F.2d at 550 n.2; see text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.
56 354 U.S. at 529, citing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 135 (1812).
57 But see Baldwin, supra note 32, at 87-90, where the author notes that the agreement between Japan and the United States in Girard contained no requirement that the
serviceman be in Japan at the time of his surrender to that country.
54
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Orloff v. Willoughby, it affords support for the proposition that it
is a valid personnel assignment, not reviewable by the courts, to
return a serviceman for the purpose of prosecution for a crime
ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the sending state when committed. A contrary result could adversely affect essential political
and security relationships of the United States, and would penalize
the United States Government for administrative error or reward
chicane. In short, the national interests which underlie the decision
in Wilson v. Girard are as great whether the serviceman is on
foreign soil or has returned to the United States, and those interests
are precisely the same in the absence of a specific agreement, such
as a status of forces agreement,as as they are in the presence thereof.

The foregoing analysis indicates that the question of whether
the armed services have the power to return a serviceman to a foreign country and surrender him for prosecution in the absence of
a treaty or statute authorizing such action has not been finally decided. On the one hand, the Third Circuit has recently permitted
two such actions without adverting to "extradition," which would
indicate that that court regards the return of a serviceman to be outside the scope of extradition law. On the other hand, as a matter of
principle such an action might fall within the definition of extradition. The rules formulated by the Supreme Court with respect to
the power to extradite are extremely broad, and they could arguably apply to all United States citizens, military and nonmilitary
alike. Moreover, it is fairly dear that membership in the armed
forces cannot deprive an individual of his constitutional and statutory rights except where the exercise of those rights is incompatible
with the legitimate needs of the armed forces.r5
58

See section III of the text, infra.

59 See notes 40-42 supra & accompanying text.
The authors have different views as to how the question of the armed forces' power
to return their personnel should be resolved. Professor Metzger is of the view, apparently accepted sub silentio in United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp.
1261 (W.D. Pa. 1970), that it is a corollary of Girard v. Wilson, 354 U.S. 524 (1957),
that a serviceman who violates the law of a host country may be surrendered summarily by the armed forces of which he is a present member, whether he is physically
present in the host country when the request is made (as in Girard) or in the United
States (as in Stone). Capt. McMahon takes the contrary view discussed in the text,
and, in addition, is of the opinion that the armed forces lack the power to conduct a
hearing adequate to satisfy the due process requirement discussed in the text accompanying note 129 infra.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 22: 617

RETURN AND SURRENDER OF SERVICEMEN
UNDER STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENTS

If we were to assume arguendo that the armed forces lack the
authority to return and surrender their members to a foreign country
absent some authorization by treaty or statute, do the status-of-forces
agreements, which govern the relationship of our armed forces with
the authorities of our allies, operate as a treaty creating an obligation to return servicemen and thereby authorize the armed services
to execute such obligation?
A brief outline of the status of American forces stationed overseas will put the present discussion in its proper perspective. For
purposes of United States law, the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Girard" settled the long-standing controversy regarding the
extent to which members of visiting armed forces are subject to or
immune from the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign. The Girard Court recognized that to the extent that Girard's rights were
not violated thereunder, the agreement between the United States
and Japan controlled the question of jurisdiction over Girard's crime.
Thus the Court rejected any argument that the host state's consent
to the presence of a foreign force in its territory implies a waiver of
criminal jurisdiction over members of the visiting forces in relation
to offenses against the host state's laws. In the absence of an international agreement, the law of the host country governs. Where
there are such agreements, they govern criminal jurisdiction over
members of the armed forces stationed in foreign countries.
Commentators have described three basic types of jurisdictional
agreements. "1 Only one type of criminal jurisdiction arrangement
will be considered here - the so-called "NATO formula,""2 which
is the basis for the division of jurisdiction between the host government and the United States military authorities in 18 countries.'
60 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
61 See G. STAMBUK, AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES ABRoAD 53 (1963); 6 M. WHITMAN, supra note 25, § 15, at 379. It should be noted that Stambuk's three categories
of agreements differ somewhat from those described in the materials reprinted in Whiteman's work.
62 See Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1798, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
6a The following 13 countries are parties to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In
addition, the basic NATO criminal jurisdiction provisions are contained in the status
of forces agreements with Australia (May 9, 1963, [1963) 14 U.S.T. 506, T.I.A.S. No.
5349), the Republic of China (Aug. 31, 1965, [1966) 17 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No.
5986), Japan (Jan. 19, 1960, [19601 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510), the Republic
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The NATO-type agreements provide that the United States military
authorities may exercise within the host state criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the United States
over all persons subject to the military law of the United States."
The host state, however, retains the right to exercise jurisdiction
over members of the forces with respect to offenses punishable by its
laws and committed within its territory. 5 If a given offense violates
both the military law of the United States and the local criminal
law, the right to try the accused is divided as follows: The United
States is granted the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over its
servicemen in relation to offenses solely against the property or
security of the United States, or solely against the person or property
of another member of the force or civilian component or of a
dependent.6 The United States also has the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over its servicemen in relation to offenses arising
out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty."1
The authorities of the host state have the primary right to exercise
jurisdiction in relation to any other offense.
The state having
primary jurisdiction may waive its jurisdiction upon request of the
other country, allowing the latter to exercise its secondary jurisdiction.6 9
The United States has no extradition treaties with four of the
18 nations with which it has NATO-type jurisdiction arrangements.
Moreover, there is no obligation and, on the authority of the Valenof Korea (July 9, 1966, [1967] 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127), and in the
amended criminal jurisdiction agreement with the Philippines (Aug. 10, 1965, [19651
16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851).
64
See Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. l(a), [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1798,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
65
See id. para. 1(b).
66 See id. para. 3(a)(i).
67 See id. para. 3(a)(ii).
68
See id. para. 3(b).
69 See id. para. 3(c).

TheNATO-type criminal jurisdiction provision is discussed in greater detail in J.
SNEE & A. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

(1957); Rouse & Baldwin, The Exercise of CriminalJurisdictionUnder the NATO Status
of ForcesAgreement, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 29 (1957). The application of the NATOtype criminal jurisdiction agreement in the Philippines is discussed in J. DODD, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE UNITED STATES-PHILIPPINE MILITARY BASES AGREE-

MENT (1968).
70

See generally G. STAMBUK, supra note 61.

These countries are the Republic of China, Denmark, the Republic of Korea,

and the Philippines.

See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1970).
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tine case,71 no power to extradite United States citizens under the
extradition treaties with nine other countries where the NATOtype agreements apply. 72 Thus, if we assume arguendo that the
armed forces lack the authority to return and surrender their members to a foreign country for prosecution in the absence of an agreement so requiring, with respect to 13 of the 18 countries the NATOtype status-of-forces agreements afford the only possible authorization for such extradition. It is therefore necessary to examine the
status-of-forces agreements to determine whether they directly or
impliedly create an obligation and the correlative authority for the
United States to extradite its servicemen.
None of the NATO-type jurisdictional agreements expressly provide that the United States must return an accused serviceman to the
host state's territory in order to make him available for prosecution.
Therefore, if the agreements do in fact require the United States to
extradite its servicemen, that requirement must be implied from the
terms of the agreements. In determining whether the various statusof-forces agreements create such an obligation by implication, three
different factual situations must be considered.
In the first type of case, an individual commits an offense which
is subject to the primary jurisdiction of the host country, but he returns to the United States, legally or illegally, before the offense or
his connection therewith is discovered. With respect to such situations it has been argued that even though the jurisdictional arrangement contains no specific provision therefor, an obligation to extradite exists by necessary implication. The crux of the argument
is that since the United States has agreed that the host country shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases, there
is an implied obligation for the United States to effectuate that agreement by making the accused available for prosecution regardless of
his whereabouts.73 The argument is both logical and persuasive.
71

Valentine v. United States ex tel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). See text accompanying notes 30-31, 38-39 supra.
72
The extradition treaties with the following nine countries provide that neither
party shall be bound to surrender its own citizens: Belgium [Oct. 26, 1901, 32 Stat.
1894 (1902), T.S. No. 409]; France [Jan. 9, 1909, 37 Star. 1526 (1911), T.S. No. 561];
the Federal Republic of Germany [July 12, 1930, 47 Star. 1862 (1931), T.S. No. 836];
Greece [May 9, 1931, 47 Star. 2185 (1932), T.S. No. 855]; Luxembourg [Oct. 29,
1883, 23 Stat. 808 (1884), T.S. No. 196]; Netherlands [June 2, 1887, 26 Stat. 1481
(1889), T.S. No. 256]; Norway [June 7, 1893, 28 Stat 1187 (1893), T.S. No. 262];
Portugal [May 7, 1908, 35 Stat. 2071 (1908), T.S. No. 512]; and Turkey [Aug. 6,
1923, 49 Stat. 2692 (1934), T.S. No. 872].
7 3 See Comment, supra note 33, at 405; Valeros, supra note 33. See also Baldwin,
supra note 88, who finds an implied obligation and authorization for the return of ser-
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Any other interpretation would, in effect, vitiate the agreement in
any case where the accused managed to depart from the territory of
the receiving state.
A contrary argument is possible. Paragraph 5 (a) of article VII
of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, the operative language
of which can be found in the status-of-forces agreements with the
non-NATO countries, provides as follows:
The authorities of the receiving and sending States shal assist
each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component
or their dependants in the territory of the receiving State and in
handing them over to the authority which74is to exercise jurisdiction
in accordance with the above provisions.
The words "in the territory of the receiving State" are open to the
interpretation that the obligation of the sending state to arrest and
hand over members of its forces is limited to individuals who are
physically within the receiving state at the time when their hand
over is demanded.7 5 It is difficult, however, reasonably to so read
that language. The territorial phrase was not contained in the original draft of the NATO Agreement submitted by the United States, 76
although it was contained in the analogous provision in the Agreement Relative to the Status of Members of the Armed Forces of the
Brussels Treaty Powers, 77 which was used as the basis for the United
States draft.78 The phrase was added in a redraft of the criminal
jurisdiction provision proposed jointly by the representatives of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France,79 and was incorporated in the first redraft of articles I to VI of the original working
paper.80 There apparently was no discussion of the amendment,8 x
vicemen in the fact that the obligation of the United States to give sympathetic consideration to a request for waiver of its primary jurisdiction does not depend upon the accused's presence in the receiving state. See Agreement Between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 3(c),
[1953) 4 U.S.T. 1800, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (discussed in text accompanying notes 62-69
supra) for the waiver provision in the NATO Agreement, which is repeated in the
other NATO-type status-of-forces agreements.
7
4 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 5(a), [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1800, T.I.A.S. No.
2846 (emphasis added).
75
See Comment, Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Revised Bases Agreements, 41
PHILIPPINE LJ. 728, 748 (1966) (discussing similar language in the criminal jurisdiction agreement between the United States and the Philippines).
76 The text of the draft submitted by the United States is reprinted in Snee, NATO
Agreement on Status: Travaux Preparatories,54 INT'L L STUDiEs 1, 345 (1961).
7
7See id. at 334; 6 M. WHITmAN, supra note 25, § 15, at 398.
78
See Snee, supra note 76, at 3.
79 See id. at 362.
80
See id. at 370. The present article VII was originally article VI.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 617

which was, in the context of the consideration of criminal jurisdiction in general, a relatively minor addition. It would appear that if
the representatives of the other countries understood the particular
language to mean that a sending state was not required to give effect
to the criminal jurisdiction arrangement in any case where the accused had departed from the receiving state's territory - a large
loophole indeed - the matter would have been the subject of considerable discussion, if not heated dispute. 2
In addition to the language of paragraph 5(a), there is other
evidence which seems to support the view that, in the factual situation presently under consideration, an obligation to extradite cannot
be implied from the terms of the NATO-type agreements. The
preambles and general tenor of the agreements indicate that they
were intended to establish a regime governing the status of the United
States forces while on foreign territory. The history of negotiations
of the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic
of Germany8 3 - which is the only negotiating history of a statusof-forces agreement, other than the NATO Agreement, presently
available - clearly indicates that the parties to that agreement understood it to be strictly territorial in scope and to create no obligations
effective outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany."'
Also, during the negotiations of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, in a discussion of the original proposal to add what later
became paragraph 8 of article VII, the Belgian representative made a
81 See id. at 93-94. The conclusions drawn are based on Snee's reprint of the summary records of the meetings of the Juridical Subcommittee on Status.
82 As used in the NATO and other status-of-forces agreements, the word "force" is
a term of art, defined somewhat differently in the various agreements, but in each case
limited to mean servicemen in the territory of the host state. Compare, e.g., Agreement
Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces,
June 19, 1951, art. I, para. 1(a), [19531 4 U.S.T. 1794, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, wvith
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of Forces in Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, art. I(a), [1960)
11 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510. It might therefore be argued that because the obligation to cooperate under paragraph 5(a) of article VII extends only to the arrest and
handing over of members of a "force," it was not intended that the agreements would
require the United States to assist in the arrest and handing over of its servicemen who
are no longer in the host state's territory. Like the territorial phrase discussed in the text,
however, it appears that the term "forces" would have been the subject of considerable
dispute if, by its adoption, the parties intended to limit the United States' obligation
to the host state's territorial borders.
83
Aug. 3, 1959, [1963) 14 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351.
84 Text of Negotiating History of NATO Status of Forces Supplementary Agreement with Germany 443, 857 (1963) (computer generated text prepared by the Air
Force Accounting and Finance Center).
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statement which appears to indicate that, in his opinion, the NATO
Agreement created no obligation to extradite.85
Notwithstanding these contrary arguments, the mutual interests
of the respective parties to the status-of-forces agreements, as well as
the policies underlying the agreements, are best served if an implied
obligation to extradite servicemen in order to surrender them to the
host state is recognized. The repercussions of a refusal to recognize
an implicit obligation to return a member of the United States armed
forces for prosecution in a case where the offense has aroused public
interest or outrage in the host country are obvious: The continued
viability of the entire criminal jurisdiction agreement could, conceivably, be cast in doubt. Recognizing an obligation to return an
accused for prosecution is in keeping with, and will give effect to,
the understanding that the host country shall have the primary right
to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. It is therefore reasonable to
conclude that the NATO-type criminal jurisdiction agreements obligate, and hence, authorize, the United States Government to return
a serviceman for trial by the host government in cases where he has
departed from the receiving state prior to the time that the offense
or his connection therewith is discovered.
The second situation raising the extradition issue is that in which
the host state discovers the crime and exercises primary jurisdiction
over the serviceman, but the United States retains custody of him.
While in the custody of United States military authorities, the individual returns to the United States either through an administrative error or by absenting himself without authority from the host
territory. As discussed previously, these were the facts in the Stone,
85
See Snee, supra note 75, at 104. As originally proposed, paragraph 8 established an unqualified rule that a man could not be tried twice for the same crime. The
Belgian representative stated that the text was unacceptable and posed, as an example,
a case where a Belgian "delinquent" was convicted by a French court but escaped to
Belgium before he had served his sentence. Under the proposed rule, the Belgian authorities would be barred from prosecuting the individual a second time, and because
the Belgian Government is not authorized to extradite its nationals, he would be immune from punishment. Id. Thus the Belgian representative apparently did not view
the Agreement as creating an obligation for the parties to extradite their servicemen.
It is further arguable that, had the Belgian representative understood the NATO
Agreement as creating such an obligation to extradite, he would have refused to be bound
by that requirement due to the absence of authority for the Belgian Government to
extradite its nationals. The fact that some parties to the agreement would refuse to extradite their own nationals does not, however, conclusively negate the existence of an implicit obligation to extradite servicemen under the Agreement. With respect to the
United States, the Supreme Court in Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 469-76 (1913),
refused to find that the refusal of Italy to extradite its own nationals in any way affected
the obligation of the United States to extradite its own citizens to Italy.
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Buskers, and Williams cases. 86 As will appear from the following
analysis, in this second type of case the status-of-forces agreements
and the arrangements which implement them clearly create an obligation for the United States to return and surrender the accused for
prosecution or punishment.
The custody arrangements regarding members of the United
States armed forces who are subject to the host state's primary right
to exercise jurisdiction vary from country to country. The NATOtype criminal jurisdiction agreements provide that if the accused
is in the custody of the United States, he shall remain in that custody
until he is charged by the host country. 7 If the accused was already
in the host government's hands or if he has been charged, the host
government has the right to retain or take custody of him. Under
mutual understandings or supplementary arrangements with a number of countries, however, the United States may take and retain
custody until the case is finally resolved."
The Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic
of Germany provides:
(a) Where the arrest has been made by the German authorities,
the arrested person shall be handed over to the authorities of the
2.

sending States concerned if such authorities so request.

(b) Where the arrest has been made by the authorities of a
sending state, or where the arrested person has been handed over to
them under sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, they
(i) may transfer custody to the German authorities at any
time;
(ii) shall give sympathetic consideration to any request
for the transfer of custody which may be made by the German
authorities in specific cases ....
3. Where custody rests with the authorities of a sending State in
accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, it shall remain with
these authorities until release or acquittal by the German authorities
or until commencement of the sentence. The authorities of the
sending State shall make the arrested person available to the German authoritiesfor investigation and criminal proceedings . . . and
shall take all appropriatemeasures to that end and to prevent any
prejudice to the course of justice .... 89
See text accompanying notes 7-20 supra.
Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, para. 5(c), [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1800,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
88
See Stanger, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Visiting Armed Forces, 52 INT'L L.
STUDIEs 253-56 (1957-1958).
89 Aug. 3, 1959, art. 22, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 556-57, T.I.A.S. No. 5351 (emphasis
added).
86
87
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A similar provision is contained in the Agreed Minutes to the Status
of Forces Agreement with the Republic of China."
The Agreed Minutes to the Criminal Jurisdiction Agreement
with the Philippines provide:
In all cases over which the Republic of the Philippines exercises
jurisdiction, the custody of an accused member of the United States
armed forces ... pending investigation, trial and final judgment,
shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the
nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing (a) that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending investigation,
trial and final judgment in a competent court of the Philippines
and (b) that he will be made available to the Philippine authorities
for investigation upon their request and (c) that he will be produced
before said court when required by it.91And the Agreed Minutes to the Status of Forces Agreement with

Japan provide:
In case the Japanese authorities have arrested an offender who
is a member of the United States armed forces .. with respect to
a case over which Japan has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, the Japanese authorities will, unless they deem that there is adequate cause and necessity to retain such offender, release him to the
custody of the United States military authorities provided that he
shall, on request, be made available to the Japanese authorities, if
such be the condition of his release. The United States authorities
shall, on request, transfer his custody to the Japanese authorities at
the time he is indicted by the latter.92

It should be noted that while the agreements are dissimilar in
certain respects, each imposes an obligation on the United States to

make the accused available to the host government for trial. Each
agreement provides that the right of the United States to retain
custody ceases either when the host state requests custody or when
a final judgment has been rendered. An obligation to surrender the
individual to the local authorities is thus either expressed or implied
in all forms of the agreements granting custody to the United States.
Does that obligation include returning the accused from the
United States if he has departed, legally or illegally, from the territory where his trial is pending prior to the time that his transfer to
90

Aug. 31, 1965, art. XIV, para. 5(c), [1966] 17 U.S.T. 387, T.I.A.S. No. 5986.

91 Agreement Relating to the Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdic-

tion Arrangements, Aug. 10, 1965, Agreed Official Minutes, para. 5, [1965] 16 U.S.T.
1095, T.I.A.S. No. 5851 (emphasis added).
92
Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of Forces in Japan, Jan. 19, 1960,
Agreed Minutes, para. 1 regarding art. XV1I, para. 5, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1753, T.I.A.S.
No. 4510 (emphasis added).
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the local authorities is required under the applicable agreement?
In the Stone case, the district court quite clearly took the view that
the status-of-forces agreement created an obligation to return Stone
to Japan:
[Tjhe Government of the United States is entitled to his custody for
the purpose of returning him to the jurisdiction where it was bound
to hold him in custody.
...He had an obligation to the Government of Japan and he
cannot here disclaim it, any more than can the3 Government of the
United States repudiate its treaty obligationsY
It is reasonable to conclude, as did the Stone court, that the obligation to keep the accused available for transfer to the host government implies an obligation for the United States to return him from
its own territory. The arguments in support of this obligation are
even more compelling than those supporting the same obligation in
the situation discussed above, where the serviceman has left the host
state prior to the discovery of the crime or his connection therewith.
When the local authorities have exercised their primary jurisdiction
and placed the offender in the custody of the United States military,
there appears to occur a clear breach of the custody provisions of
the applicable status-of-forces agreement if the United States refuses
to recognize its custodial obligations where the offender has returned
to the United States. The failure of the United States Government
to consider itself bound to return such servicemen has caused particularly adverse reactions within one host state,9" and unless altered,
it will continue to jeopardize our relations with parties to the NATOtype agreements.
The third factual situation arises in cases where the offense either
is subject to the primary jurisdiction of the United States or the host
93 United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261, 1269 (W.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
94 The United States failed to recognize this obligation in a number of cases which
arose in the Philippines after World War II. The refusal to return the offenders from
the United States caused indignation among the people and the Government of the
Philippines, who believed that the Bases Agreement created an obligation to surrender
the accused even though he had returned to the United States and separated from the
service. See generally J. DODD, supra note 69; G. TAYLOR, THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE UNITED STATES: PROBLEMS OF PARTNERSHIP 237 (1964); Valeros, supra note 33;
Comment, supra note 33. One commentator has indicated that this asserted lack of an
obligation to return servicemen to the Philippines was not remedied by the 1965 amendment to the criminal jurisdiction agreement with that country. He cites a 1966 case in
which the United States again refused to return one of its servicemen who, having been
charged by Philippine authorities, had been reassigned to the United States. Comment,
supra note 33, at 748-49. The commentator suggests that "[sluch a deficiency can bring
about the actual nullification of jurisdiction of Philippine courts." Id. at 749.
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country waives its primary jurisdiction in favor of the United States.
The United States military authorities either acquit the accused after a
full trial, or decide not to prosecute. After the individual concerned
is rotated back to the United States, the host government decides to
exercise its secondary jurisdiction or to recall its waiver of primary
jurisdiction. Does the NATO-type status-of-forces agreement impose
an obligation to return the individual for trial in such cases ?
If the individual has been tried and acquitted by the United States
military authorities within the territory of the requesting state, there
is no such obligation because the NATO-type agreements incorporate
the rule of non bis in idem in such circumstances. The rule provides
that where an accused has been tried by one state in accordance with
the provisions of the jurisdiction agreement and has been acquitted,
or has been convicted and is serving or has served his sentence, he
may not later be tried for the same offense within the same territory. 5 Since the host state could not properly exercise jurisdiction
for a second trial in such a case, no obligation to return the accused
for trial can be implied.
The result may be different, however, if the individual has been
tried outside the territory of the host state which is requesting his
return or if the United States has taken no action at all against an
accused over whom it has primary jurisdiction under the agreement.
The non bis in idem provision does not bar a subsequent trial of the
accused when an earlier trial was conducted outside the host state's
territory. 0 And primary jurisdiction, by definition, does not mean
exclusive jurisdicion. Thus, some commentators have expressed the
view that where trial by the host state is not prohibited by the non
his in idem provision, the host government may exercise its secondary

95 Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement provides as follows:
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this
Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted,
or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been
pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in
this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from
trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from
an act or omission which constituted an offense for which he was tried by the
authorities of another Contracting Party. Agreement Between the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, July 19,
1951, art. VII, para. 8, [1953) 4 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
A similar provision appears in the NATO-type criminal jurisdiction agreements
with non-NATO countries. See agreements cited note 63 supra.
0
0 See note 95 supra.
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right of jurisdiction." Where the terms of the agreement grant the
host state the secondary right to prosecute the accused, that right
can be effective only if the United States, having decided not to
prosecute the serviceman, recognizes an obligation to return him to
the host state at the latter's request.
This third factual situation also presents two other important
issues. First, the question arises whether any action short of trial will
render operative the non bis in idem provision of the criminal jurisdiction agreements. Would a determination by the United States
military authorities not to refer the case to trial after a formal investigation under article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,"8
or the imposition of nonjudicial punishment under article 15 of the
Code,"9 operate to bar prosecution by the host government and thus
vitiate its right to demand the return of the accused? The most
prominent commentators in the field have indicated that in their
opinion, prosecution by the host state would not be barred under
such circumstances. 100 Although they conclude that the host government should in practice refrain from exercising jurisdiction where
the United States has made a determination not to prosecute after a
careful investigation of the facts of the case, the commentators persuasively argue that the host state's exercise of its secondary jurisdiction would not be prohibited by the non bis in idem provision.
Second, when the host government has waived its primary right
to exercise jurisdiction, the question arises whether the host country
may reassert its jurisdiction and demand the return of the individual
if the United States fails to prosecute. In a case not involving a serviceman's return to the United States, the French Cour de Cassation
held that a French waiver of its primary right was irrevocable despite the fact that the United States decided, after an informal investigation, that charges were not warranted."0 ' Other nations are,
of course, in no way bound by the French decision. Nonetheless,
while it might be argued that a waiver by the host state is subject
97

See J. SNEE & A. PYE, supra note 69, at 63-91; G. STAMBUK, supra note 61,
at 98; Stanger, supra note 88, at 194.
98 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
99 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 815(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
100 J. SNEE & A. PYE, supra note 69, at 71.
101 Aitchison v. Whitley, [19581 J.C.P. II, No. LXIII. See generally J. DoDD, supra
note 69, at 121-23; G. STAMBUK, supra note 61, at 96-106. The case involved an
attempt by a Canadian widow to initiate a criminal action in a French court - after
French officials had waived primary jurisdiction over the matter - against an American
serviceman whose wreckless driving had caused the death of the woman's husband, a
member of the Canadian NATO forces in France.
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to an implied condition that the host state's jurisdiction will revest unless the United States makes a judicial ruling,102 there seems to be
no persuasive reason why an otherwise unconditional waiver should
be so read. If the host country wishes to make its waiver conditional, it can easily do so by incorporating terms to that effect.
Assuming from the three factual situations discussed above that
the NATO-type status-of-forces agreements impose an obligation on
the United States - at the international level - to extradite servicemen, it is necessary to consider whether these agreements satisfy
the requirement of the United States extradition law that the extra10 3
dition of a citizen must rest on a duty under a treaty or statute.
(This requirement has been assumed arguendo to be applicable to the
return and surrender of members of the armed forces.) If these
agreements do satisfy the above requirement, it is also necessary to
consider whether the armed services are the appropriate agency to
execute the obligation to extradite.
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement was ratified with the
formal advice and consent of the Senate,10 4 and it is therefore a
"treaty" in the constitutional sense of the term. Thus, to the extent
to which its provisions create an international obligation for the
United States to extradite its servicemen, the NATO Agreement
creates a duty to -extradite under United States law.
The NATO-type status-of-forces agreements with. non-NATO
countries, however, were not ratified with the advice and consent of
the Senate; 0 5 rather, these agreements are merely executive agreements authorized by the mutual defense treaties which they implement,1' 6 with the exception of the agreement with the Philippines,"0 7
0 2
1 See generally G. STAMBUK, s-pra note 61, at 96-103 (discussing the lower court's
decision in the Whitley case).
103 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936).
10 4
Status of Forces Agreement with the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, June
19, 1951, [1953) 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (ratified by the Senate July 15,

1953).
105 The Senate considered the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the
Security Treaty with Japan [Feb. 28, 1952, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 24923
before it gave its consent to the Security Treaty itself [Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3
U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 2491]. The Administrative Agreement was not, however,
a treaty in the constitutional sense [see Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 526-29 (1956)],
nor is its present-day counterpart, the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan [Jan. 19,
1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.IA&S. No. 4510]. The Status of Forces Agreement
with Japan is an executive agreement, authorized by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security with Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509.
108See, e.g., Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States
Forces, July 9, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.
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which was authorized by a joint resolution of Congress. 10 8 The law
of the United States is unclear as to whether an extradition obligation
can be incurred only under a treaty, as opposed to an executive agreement. In Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,0 9 the Supreme Court held that extradition is permissible only as required by
a treaty or statute. And the federal extradition statute permits extradition only pursuant to a "treaty of extradition. '"I"
The fact
that the word "treaty" is used is not necessarily dispositive, however, since it is possible, though unlikely, that the term was used in
the international sense of any international agreement, rather than
in the constitutional sense of an international engagement made with
the advice and consent of the Senate."'
In determining whether an executive agreement could be considered to be a treaty for this purpose, it is appropriate to distinguish between the various types of executive agreements. In the
case of an executive agreement made solely pursuant to the President's constitutional authority, such a construction would run counter
to the spirit of the Valentine decision"l2 since it would result in
the exercise of the extradition power by the Executive alone, without
legislative assent in the form of advice and consent to a treaty or
the enactment of a statute. Moreover, the fact that apparently all
of the United States extradition agreements are treaties - in the
constitutional sense - and not executive agreements, seems to indicate that an obligation to extradite can be incurred only under
a treaty. Thus, even though executive agreements have to a large extent replaced the treaty as the primary instrument for international
engagements by the United States, extradition agreements are still
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent." 3
Although an executive agreement undertaken solely under the
President's constitutional authority would not support a duty to
extradite under United States law, it appears that the NATO-type
status-of-forces agreements, being executive agreements authorized
by mutual defense treaties and in one case by a joint resolution of
107 Agreement Relating to the Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, Aug. 10, 1965, [1965] 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851.
108 58 Star. 625 (1944).

109 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936).
110 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1964).
Ill See Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912).
112 299

U.S. at 9-10.

113 A recent example is the new extradition agreement with New Zealand.
DEP'T STATE BULL. 760 (June 15, 1970).

See 62
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Congress, may support such a duty. Senate approval of the mutual
defense treaties constitutes advance consent to the criminal jurisdiction agreements thereunder, giving these agreements the same status
as extradition treaties to the extent that the agreements do in fact require extradition." 4 The district court in the Stone case" 5 may have
adopted this view sub silentio (if it indeed believed that the United
States extradition law was relevant to the return and surrender of
servicemen), since it made no attempt to justify its giving an obligation under an executive agreement the same weight - under United
States extradition law - as a commitment created by a treaty in the
constitutional sense. To support such a finding, it would be necessary to show that the mutual defense treaty with Japan authorized
an implementing agreement providing for extradition. In this regard, it should be noted that in Wilson v. Girard"6 the Supreme
Court upheld the waiver of jurisdiction by United States military
authorities under an executive agreement with Japan,"' the Court
finding that agreements respecting the status of United States servicemen had been authorized by the mditual defense treaty in force
with Japan when the agreement was signed." 8 It could similarly be
argued that the current mutual defense treaty with Japan, which also
provides for agreements respecting the status of United States servicemen in Japan," 9 authorizes executive agreements which require the
extradition of servicemen when such a requirement is an integral
part of the agreement respecting the servicemen's status. In the
Girard case, however, the authority to extradite under an executive
agreement was not at issue, since Girard was within the territory of
Japan at the time of his surrender. A contrary argument could therefore be made that the mutual defense treaty with Japan, and those
with other non-NATO countries, authorize only executive agreements
governing the status of United States forces within the respective
1-14 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 142, at 440 (1965).
115 United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa.), af'd,431
F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970); see text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
116 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
117 Amendment of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III
of the Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No.
2848.
118 Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No.
2491, superseded by, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960]
11 U.S.T. 1634, T.I.A.S. No. 4509. See note 120 infra
"9 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, art. VI, [1960] 11
U.S.T. 1634, T.I.A.S. No. 4509. See note 120 infra.
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foreign territories 120 and that agreements having effect outside of
such territories are not authorized by the treaties. Nothing in
Girard,however, indicates that its rationale is so limited, and to so
read Girard does not appear to be consistent with its thrust.
Because the NATO-type Status of Forces Agreement with the
Philippines 121 was authorized by a joint resolution of Congress,'1 22 it
would similarly appear to support a duty to extradite. Although
the joint resolution authorizing agreements respecting the status of
United States servicemen in the Philippines is obviously not a treaty
in the constitutional sense because it was effected without a twothirds vote of the Senate, it does meet the Valentine requirement
that any duty to extradite must rest upon the authorization of Congress. 23
Even if we assume that an executive agreement authorized by
treaty, such as the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, would be
sufficient as a matter of United States law to authorize extradition
of military personnel, another legal hurdle might remain. The federal extradition statute appoints the Secretary of State as the United
States functionary who may order a fugitive to be delivered to an
agent of the requesting government.1 4 He may do so only after
a justice, judge, or magistrate has conducted a hearing, considered
the evidence supporting the criminal charges, and found that evidence
to be sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the
0

12 For example, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea, Oct. 1.

1953, art. IV, [1954) 5 U.S.T. 2373, T.I.A.S. No. 3097, provides:
The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the
right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory
of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement. (Emphasis
added.)
And the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, art.
VI, [19601 11 U.S.T. 1634, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, provides:
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America
is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities, and areas in
Japan.
The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States
armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing
the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February
28, 1952, as amended by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.
(Emphasis added.)
121 Agreement Relating to the Military Bases in the Philippines: Criminal Jurisdiction Arrangements, Aug. 10, 1965, [1965) 16 U.S.T. 1090, T.I.A.S. No. 5851.
122 58 Stat. 625 (1944).
123 299 U.S. at 9-10.
124 18 U.S.C. § 3185 (1964).
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applicable extradition treaty.2 5 And he may refuse to surrender the
fugitive even though the magistrate found that the requirements for
extradition had been met.126 The statute operates in the case of all
extradition agreements. 2 7 The Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law indicates, however, that a self-executing executive agreement - requiring no ancillary legislation - made pursuant to a
28
treaty supersedes inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress.
The custody arrangements discussed in the second factual situation
above appear to be self-executing, since they contemplate that the
United States military authorities, without further legislative authorization, will be responsible for making the accused available to the
foreign country. Thus, under the Restatement view, United States
military authorities might have the full authority to extradite servicemen - notwithstanding the formal requirements of the extradition
statute - to the extent that the custody arrangements require extradition. Similarly, because the criminal jurisdiction arrangements
discussed in the first and third factual situations appear to be selfexecuting, those arrangements could be found to support the authority for United States military officials to extradite servicemen
to the extent that the obligation to extradite can be implied therefrom.
Although United States military authorities may thus be authorized to extradite servicemen without adhering to the procedure required under the extradition statute, it seems dear that an individual
may not be surrendered to a foreign country without an appropriate
hearing. In Sayne v. Shipley' 29 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that due process guaranteed a serviceman the right to
a hearing prior to his extradition from the Canal Zone to Panama.
It is therefore doubtful that membership in the armed forces makes
an individual amenable to extradition merely at the order of an appropriate military commander, without a hearing. Since the armed
services have the authority to convene statutory and nonstatutory
boards which act as administrative tribunals 80 and military judges
125

18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964).

12 6 See M. WHMTEMAN, supra note 25, § 35, at 1026-28.
127 See Ex parte Chariton, 185 F. 880 (C.C.D.N.J.), arfd sub nom. Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447 (1911).
28

1pSTATEMENT

(SEcoND)

oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §§ 141-42, at 432-33, 440 (1965).
29 418 F.2d 679, 686 (5th Cir. 1969).
1 0

3 See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 27-187, MILITARY AFFAIRS

132-151 (1966).
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who preside over courts-martial have authority recognized by
statute,131 the military branch concerned should be able to provide
an adequate hearing to satisfy this requirement. The extradition
statute itself is satisfied by a hearing before "any magistrate authorized . . . by a court of the United States.' '1 32 It therefore appears that a hearing before a federal judge is not essential to satisfy
the due process requirement for a hearing. Moreover, as the Sayne
case indicates, 133 the hearing on a serviceman's petition for habeas
corpus or for an injunction prohibiting his return could satisfy the
due process requirement.
IV.

EFFECT OF STATUS OF FORCES

AGREEMENTS ON UNITED STATES EXTRADITION

TREATIES REQUIRING THE EXTRADITION
OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS

As noted above, the United States has no extradition treaty with
four of 18 countries which are parties to the NATO-type status-offorces agreements, 34 and the extradition treaties with nine of the
other countries do not require the extradition of United States citizens.' 3 5 United States nationals are extraditable under the extradition treaties with the five remaining countries. 36 Where the accused is a United States serviceman, do the criminal jurisdiction arrangements with the latter countries affect their right to demand extradition under the treaty and the obligation of the United States to
comply with such a demand?
The question can arise in the third type of factual situation previously discussed, where the offense is subject to the primary juris131 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (Supp. V, 1970).
132 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964).
133

418 F.2d at 686.

134 See note 70 supra.
135 See note 72 supra.
136
The extradition treaties with four of these countries require the extradition of
"persons": Australia and the United Kingdom [Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Star. 2122 (1932),
T.S. No. 8491; Italy [Mar. 22, 1868, T.S. No. 629 (1868), T.S. No. 174]; and Canada [Aug. 9, 1842, art. X, 8 Stat. 572 (1842), T.S. No. 119]. Under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Chariton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1911), the term "persons" includes
citizens of the United States.
The extradition treaty with Japan [Apr. 29, 1886, art. VII, 24 Stat. 1015 (1886),
T.S. No. 191] allows the extradition of United States citizens at the discretion of the
President. While the Supreme Court has never specifically held that treaties which grant
the Executive a discretionary power to extradite individual United States citizens are
valid, it has tacitly approved of such treaties. See Valentine v. United States ex rel.
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 12 (1936); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 467 (1911).
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diction of the United States or the host country waives its primary
jurisdiction in favor of the United States; the United States acquits
the accused after a full trial or decides not to prosecute; and the
host country, being dissatisfied with the result, demands extradition
under the extradition treaty. If the individual has been tried and
acquitted by a United States court-martial in the territory of the requesting state, the non his in idem rule in the NATO-type statusof-forces agreement would bar the serviceman's surrender for further
prosecution by the host state.lST If the individual has been tried and
acquitted outside the host state, or if the United States military authorities failed to take action against him, the non his in idem provision of the status-of-forces agreement would not be operative, and
the United States might be obligated to return him under the extradition treaty and, arguably, under the status-of-forces agreement itself.18
There is a real danger of unfairness to the accused where he has
already been tried and acquitted by a United States military court
outside the territory of the requesting state. Since non his in idem
does not appear to be a general rule of international law, the
United States would seem obliged under the extradition treaty to
return the accused for trial by the requesting state. The extradition
treaty with the United Kingdom, which also applies to Australia two of the five countries with respect to which this problem would
arise - specifically provides that the individual need not be surrendered if he has been tried by the United States."" There is no
such protective provision in the extradition treaties with the other
three countries, and these countries could apparently demand the
extradition of a United States serviceman who had been tried and
140
acquitted outside of the host state's territory.
3 7

See note 95 supra & accompanying text.
text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
130 Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, art. 4, 47 Stat. 2122 (1932),
T.S. No. 849.
140 The same threat of double jeopardy could conceivably arise under a NATO-type
status-of-forces agreement itself, in the absence of an extradition treaty requiring the
extradition of United States citizens. Thus, a serviceman could have been tried and
acquitted in a territory outside of the host country, and the host country could then
demand his return and surrender under the implied obligation created by the criminal
jurisdiction arrangements. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra. The courts of
the United States, however, must recognize any such implied obligation before it will
support a duty to extradite under United States extradition law, and it is unlikely that
the courts would recognize an extradition obligation which would violate any funda1

188 See

mental rights of the accused. Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1956).
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CONCLUSION

In determining whether the United States armed forces may
order or compel an individual to return to a foreign country to face
trial or punishment by the local authorities, it should be recalled that
the Supreme Court has defined extradition as "the surrender by one
nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense
outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of
the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him demands
The facts in the Stone,14 2 Buskers,'43 and Wilthe surrender."'hams'" cases fell squarely within that definition. Nonetheless, the
courts in these cases did not consider whether the United States extradition law governed the return and surrender of the respective servicemen.
Assuming that the rule in the Valentine case" 5 - that a duty
to extradite United States citizens can be created only by treaty or
statute - is applicable to the return and surrender of United States
servicemen, it appears that the NATO-type criminal jurisdiction
arrangement could be construed as imposing an obligation on the
United States Government to return an accused serviceman from the
United States for trial by the courts of a host state. This is particularly true where the individual departed from the foreign country
while he was in custody of the United States forces, awaiting proseSimilarly,
cution under the host state's primary jurisdiction. 14
where the United States military authorities have failed to fully exercise their jurisdiction over the serviceman, 4 7 the criminal jurisdiction arrangements could be construed as requiring the United States
military authorities to make the serviceman available to the host
state for prosecution. And where these obligations are created by
executive agreements, those agreements could be found to have the

141 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270,289 (1902).
142 United States ex. rel. Stone v. Robinson, 309 F. Supp. 1261 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970). See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra,
143 Buskers v. Seamans, Civil No. 1208-70 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 1970), stay denied, No.
19,270 (3d Cit. Sept. 18, 1970), stay denied, Memorandum Order (U.S. Sept. 19, 1970)
(Blackmun, Cir. J.). See text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
144 Williams v. Rogers, Civil No. 1027 (D.N.D. May 6, 1971), appeal pending,
No. 71-1249 (9th Cir., filed May 10, 1971). See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
See text ac145 Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
companying notes 38-39 supra.
146 See text accompanying notes 86-94 supra.
147 See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
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advance consent of the Senate through the mutual defense treaties
48
which they implement.
In addition, there is support for the position that the NATOtype status-of-forces agreements, being self-executing executive agreements, can authorize military authorities to extradite servicemen,
notwithstanding the requirement under the federal extradition statAnd the
ute149 that the Secretary of State rule on the extradition.'
due process requirement that the serviceman be afforded a hearing
prior to extradition appears to be satisfied by the hearing on the
serviceman's petition for habeas corpus or injunctive relief. 5 '
Although the Stone, Buskers, and Williams cases may thus have
reached justifiable results, it is dear that the courts' silence respecting
the issue of extradition by the armed forces has left many crucial
questions unanswered.
148 See text accompanying notes 105-20 supra.
149 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (Supp. V, 1970), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1964).
150 See text accompanying notes 124-28 supra.
15 1

See text accompanying notes 129-33 supra.

